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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Fire Insurance-Application of the "Hostile Fire-Friendly
Fire" Rule
A valuable sapphire ring was inadvertently thrown into a trash
burner where it was damaged by fire to the extent of $900. The fire
had been intentionally lighted in the trash burner and was confined
at all times to that receptacle where it was supposed to be. Action was
brought to recover for the damage to the ring under a policy of standard
form covering "all direct loss or damage by fire." The lower court
rendered a judgment for plaintiff; defendant appealed and the Kansas
Supreme Court reversed, with two judges dissenting, holding that the
fire in question was a "friendly fire" and loss therefrom was not cov-
ered by the policy.'
In determining the liability of the insurer against damage by fire
within the meaning of standard insuring clauses, the courts have almost
universally adopted a rather subtle distinction between fires that are
hostile and those that are friendly, notwithstanding that such distinc-
tion is not made in the language of the policy itself.2 A hostile fire is
defined as being a fire unexpected, in a place not intended for it to
be and where fire is not ordinarily maintained, or as one which has
escaped from its usual or intended place.3 Once the existence of a
hostile fire is proved, the liability of the insurer extends beyond the
immediate consequences of ignition and covers any loss proximately
caused by fire.4 A friendly fire is one which is intentionally lighted
I Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951).
- Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572
(1927); Mode, Limited v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 62 Idaho 270, 110 P. 2d 840
(1941) and cases cited therein; Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass.
67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896); Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Reciprocal Ex-
change, 109 S. W. 2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Austin v. Drewe, 4 Camp. 360,
171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6 Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep.
1104 (1816) ; 5 AiPLEm"A, IN SURANCE LAW AND PRAcncE §3082 (1941) ; VANCE
ON INSURANCE: 869, 870 (3rd ed. 1951); 45 C. J. S., Insurance, §809. Contrc:
Louisiana. "Whatever may be said of 'friendly' or 'unfriendly' fires, there is no
such distinction recognized in the policy." Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co.,
161 So. 340, 342 (La. App. 1935). No North Carolina case has been found in
which the distinction between "friendly" and "hostile" fires was at issue.
'Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. C. C. Anderson Co., 47 F. Supp. 90 (D. Idaho 1942);
Cannon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 Ga. 563, 35 S. E. 775 (1900) ; Youse v. Employers
Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951) ; Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins.
Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S. W. 490 (1924); Coryell v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 118
Neb. 312, 229 N. W. 326 (1930), setting aside, 118 Neb. 303, 224 N. W. 684
(1929); 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAmccE §3082 (1941); 26 C. I.,
Fire Insurance'§429.
'Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Nelson, 90 Colo. 524, 10 P. 2d 943 (1932)
(damage from smoke and soot where fire escaped from range and burned floor
and walls) ; Queen Ins. Co. v. Patterson Drug Co., 73 Fla. 665, 74 So. 807 (1917)
(loss by theft of goods removed because of fire); Nash v. American Ins. Co.,
188 Iowa 127, 174 N. W. 378 (1920) (damage caused by fire set in a silo for
thawing ensilage Which accidentally blazed up to the top of the silo) ; Way v.
Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896) (damage by
smoke and soot from fire caused by ignition of soot in chimney) ; Lynn G. & E. Co.
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and confined within its usual limits, such as a blaze produced by lighting
a match, or a gas jet or lamp, or a stove, furnace, or incinerator, and
is employed for lighting, heating, cooking, manufacturing, or other
common and usual everyday purposes.5 A friendly fire is not a fire
within the usual terms of a policy and recovery cannot be had for smoke,
soot, or heat damage (short of ignition) arising from such fire.0
The Kansas case under consideration 'adopts the above distinction
in denying recovery under a fire insurance policy for the loss of an
article accidentally or negligently thrown into a fire which was inten-
tionally set and burning in its intended place. The majority of the
courts in the United States in which the point has been raised have
v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33 N. E. 690 (1893) (damage to machin-
ery in a part of the building not reached by the fire from short circuiting of
'electric current caused by the fire) ; Russell v. German Fire Ins. Co., 100 Minn.
528, 111 N. W. 400 (1907) (damage caused by fall of wall of adjacent building
due to its burning); Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App.
31, 260 S. W. 490 (1924) (damage caused by smoke and soot given off from
explosion of hot water furnace where coals were blown out on earthen floor of
basement) ; Coryell v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 118 Neb. 312, 229 N. W. 326 (1930),
setting aside, 118 Neb. 303, 224 N. W. 684 (1929) (damage from fire, smoke and
soot caused by flames shooting from open furnace door of oil burner) ; Firemen's
Ins. Co. v. Houle, 96 N. H. 30, 69 A. 2d 696 (1949) (damage by water) ; White-
hurst v. Ins. Co., 51 N. C. 352 (1859) (damage caused by water in extinguishing
fire and losses by theft consequent on removal of goods) ; Collins v. Delaware Ins.
Co., 9 Pa. Super Ct. 576 (1899) (damage caused by smoke and soot from a coal
oil stove where fire extended to the tank in which the oil was kept) ; Watson v.
American Colony Ins. Co., 179 S. C. 149, 183 S. E. 692 (1936) (damage resulting
from removal of article because of fire) ; Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v.
Reciprocal Exchange, 109 S. W. 2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (damage to boiler
by fire entering and burning in compartments intended for water) ; City of New
York Ins. Co. v. Gugenheim, 7 S. W. 2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928 (damage by
smoke and soot from fire escaping into furnace compartment intended for air
space) ; Pappadakis v. Netherlands Fire & Life Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac.
641 (1926) (water damage caused by heat and flame escaping from a crack in the
top of an oven and releasing a sprinkler valve); O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.,
140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1038 (1909) (damage by smoke, soot and heat from
excessive fire in furnace caused by highly inflammable materials not intended for
such purpose).
' See note 3 supra.
'Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572(1927) (damage by smoke and soot from a fire confined to and never outside of
the furnace); Cannon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 Ga. 563, 35 S. E. 775 (1900)(loss by smoke, soot and heat from a defective stovepipe); Gibbons v. German
Ins. Co., 30 Ill. App. 263 (1889) (heat caused by steam escaping from a broken
steam pipe); Hansen v. Lemars Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 193 Iowa 1, 186 N. W. 468(1922) (smoke and soot escaping from an oil stove) ; McGraw v. Home Ins. Co.,
93 Kan. 482, 144 Pac. 821 (1914) (damage to steam boiler from excessive heat
and insufficient water) ; American Towing Co. v. German Fire Ins. Co., 74 Md.
25, 21 Atl. 553 (1891) (injury to boiler from heat) ; Wasserman v. Caledonian-
American Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 518, 95 N. E. 2d 547 (1950) (damage to heating
system because of lack of water. in boiler); Consoli v. Commonwealth Ins. Co.,
84 A. 2d 926 (N. H. 1951) (damage to cans of fruit on shelf near stove from
excessive heat of stove; Davis v. Law Union & Rock Ins. Co., 166 Misc. 75, 1N. Y. S. 2d 344 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1937) (smoke and soot escaping from afurnace) ; Fitzgerald v. German-American Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 72, 62 N. Y. Supp.
824 (County Ct. 1899) (damage caused by smoke from a lamp) ; Austin v. Drewe,
4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6 Taunt. 436, 128
Eng. Rep. 1104 (1816) (smoke and excessive heat from stove and flue).
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denied recovery for loss or damage to jewelry in such cases.7 Louisiana
alone seems to permit recovery, refusing to make a distinction between
an accidental loss resulting from a friendly fire and an accidental loss
resulting from a hostile fire.8  Only two cases have been found which
are in agreement with the Louisiana case: a French decision, Countess
Fitz-Jamws v. Union Fire Ins. Co.,° and a recent English case, Harris
v. Poland.°
This distinction between hostile and friendly fires had its beginnning
in the early English case of Austin v. Drewe." It has been criticized
and restricted by some authorities and courts,' 2 but yet recognized and
followed in the United States in all cases since except for the decision
in Louisiana.'3 There would seem to be doubt as to the correctness of
Mode, Limited v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 62 Idaho 270, 110 P. 2d 840(1941); Harter v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 257 Mich. 163, 241 N. W. 196 (1932);
Weiner v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dep't
1924) ; aff'd without opinion, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1st Dep't
1925); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Naman, 118 Tex. 21, 6 S. W. 2d 743 (1928). The
argument is that where property is destroyed by being inadvertently deposited in
a fire which was intentionally set and which at no time escaped from its usual
and intended limits and which was at all times under control, it is destroyed by a
"friendly fire," not a "hostile fire," and the loss or damage 'sustained is not "direct
loss or damage by fire" within the meaning of fire policies. The point is also
made that in common parlance and everyday usage a person has not "had a fire"
so long as it has only burned in its intended place and where fire is ordinarily
maintained.
' Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935) (recovery
allowed for destruction of bracelet inadvertently thrown into trash burner). See
also Watson v. American Colony Ins. Co., 179 S. C. 149, 183 S. E. 692 (1936)
(where the insured was allowed to recover for the destruction of a ring inad-
vently thrown into a friendly fire in an attempt to put out a hostile fire).
'23 IRsH LAw TIMES & SOLCITOR'S J. 169, March 30, 1889 (recovery allowed
for the destruction of a pearl earring accidentally knocked into a fire burning in
a grate).
10 [1941] 1 K. B. 462, 164 L. T. 283 (K. B.) (recovery allowed for damage
to jewelry caused by a fire inadvertently lit in a grate in which the jewelry had
been placed for safekeeping.
4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6 Taunt.
436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1816). The insured suffered damage from excessive
heat and smoke to sugar in the process of refining from the failure of an employee
to open a register at the top of the flue. The insurance company was held not
to be liable as there was no fire within the meaning of' the policy, since the fire
never was excessive and was always confined within its proper limits; nothing
was consumed by fire and the loss was due only to heat and smoke arising from
the negligent management of the machinery. Said the court, the company might
as well be sued for damage done to furniture by a smoky chimney; had the fire
been brought out of the flue and anything had been burnt, the insurer would have
been liable. Whereupon, states the reporter, the jury "with great reluctance, found
a verdict for the defendant." See Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass.
67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896) where the terms "friendly" and "hostile" first seem to
have been applied to fires in this connection.
"Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896);
Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S. W. 490
(1924); Coryell v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 118 Neb. 312, 229 N. W. 326 (1930),
setting aside, 118 Neb. 303, 224 N. W. 684 (1929) ; Pappadakis v. Netherlands F.
& L. Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641 (1926) ; O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.;
of America, 140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1038 (1909) ; 2 MAY ON INSURANCE §402
(3d ed. 1891) ; Vance, Friendly Fires, 1 CoNN. B. J. 284 (1927).
1" It must be remembered that the decision of the Louisiana court is based upon
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the basic fact presumption in the doctrine, i.e., that both insured and
insurer contracted with the understanding that the term "loss by fire"
means loss by a "hostile fire" as the majority of courts have defined
"hostile" in the past. Words used in insurance contracts are to be
interpreted according to their plain and ordinary sense so as to give
effect to the intention of the parties.14 The test is not what the insurer
intended the words to mean but the meaning that would be given to
them by a reasonable person in the position of the insured.1 A reason-
able person might interpret the words "loss by fire" according to the
distinction of hostile or friendly fires in the case of a smoky chimney
or furnace but not where there has been an actual burning of the
insured article.
The rule of construction so established is not at all in harmony with
the general policy of American courts in construing insurance policies
of whatever type to resolve every doubt as to the meaning of the words
employed in favor of the insured claiming indemnity for an honest
loss. 6 There can be, of course, no question but that the damage suf-
fered by the plaintiff in the above case was caused by "fire," or that it
falls within the literal meaning of the words, "loss or damage by fire."
All of the cases decided in the United States on this point, other
than a New York case decided earlier,'1 7 rely very heavily on the opinion
a fact situation in which an actual burning of the insured article occurs as a result
of the fire, and hence may be distinguished from Austin v. Drewe. It is possible
that Louisiana would recognize the distinction between hostile and friendly fires
in case of damage short of burning (smoke, soot, heat-cracking), from a fire in-
tentionally lit and confined at all times within its accustomed limits, although
language in the case is sufficiently broad to argue that the court did not intend
that the distinction should be applied to any situation. Salmon v. Concordia Fire
Ins. Co., 161 So. 340, 342 (La. App. 1935).
" Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452 (1894); Standard
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. McNulty, 157 Fed. 224 (8th Cir. 1907) ; Jones v. Hawkeye
Commercial Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa 1299, 168 N. W. 305 (1918); Youse v. Em-
ployers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951) ; Spence v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 154 Kan. 379, 118 P. 2d 514 (1941) ; Ashley v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co.,
241 Mich. 441, 217 N. W. 27 (1928) ; Birss v. United Commercial Travelers, 109
Neb. 226, 190 N. W. 486 (1922) ; and cases collected in 26 C. J., Fire Insurance
§69, n. 96.
" Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951); Braly v.
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 170 Kan. 531, 227 P. 2d 571 (1951). 'As other-
wise stated, words of an insurance policy should be adjudged in the light of the
speech and understanding of the comman man." VANCE ON IN SURANCE 809 (3d
ed. 1951).
"The liability of an insurance company is ordinarily measured by the terms
of the policy, but in the event of ambiguity it will be strictly construed against
the insurer and liberally construed in favor of the insured. VANCE ON INSURANCE
808-810 (3d ed. 1951); 29 Am. JuR., Insurance §166, n. 16; 26 C. J., 'Fire In-
surance §70, n. 19.
"7Weiner v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N. Y. Supp. 279
(1st Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 214 App. Diiv. 784, 210 N. Y. Supp. 935
(1st Dep't 1925) (recovery denied where jewelry placed in stove for safekeeping
and damaged when fire was later built).
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of the Texas court in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Nanan. In that opin-
ion it is said: "The contract of insurance contemplates that the insurer
will pay the insured the damages for all direct loss proximately caused
by fire within the meaning of the policy. A friendly fire is not within
the undertaking of the insurance company at all. If it were, the com-
pany would be liable, as in a case of unfriendly fire, for all direct loss
or damage, irrespective of destruction or of actual ignition, and the fact
that in this case there was an actual consumption of the insured prop-
erty is of no importance in determining the liability of the insurance
company. If the fire in the furnace was such a fire as the company
insured against, then it would be liable for any direct loss or damage
therefrom, and it would follow the insured could recover his damage
for loss occasioned by the cracking of plaster in the furnace basement
from the heat of the furnace, for the cracking of the paper on the
walls from the heat of the grate, and for damage to the decoration
and draperies through smoke and soot from the furnace or chimney
place, and even for the replacement of furnace, grate, and range oven
when burned out, for those clearly would be losses directly due to the
respective fires. Those are not extreme illustrations, but liability in
each instance would follow if the fire in this case be held to be within
the policy."'19 The Texas court seems to have overlooked the fact that
the friendly fire doctrine can be restricted without eliminating it alto-
gether. In any situation short of an actual burning of the insured
article, recovery could be denied; but with the burning of the insured
article there has really come into being a hostile fire, and recovery
might be allowed without any danger that the situations feared by the
Texas court would follow. The statement of the court that the actual
consumption of the insured property in this case is of no importance
in determining the liability of the insurance company is clearly erroneous,
for this is one of the essential criteria in determining whether or not
recovery should be allowed for damage resulting from a fire friendly
in its origin.20  The losses in the illustrations mentioned by the court,
" 118 Tex. 21, 6 S. W. 2d 743 (1928) (recovery denied where jewelry acci-
dentally thrown into furnace). See City of New York Ins. Co. v. Gugenheim,
7 S. W. 2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), where recovery was allowed for damage
by smoke and soot from fire escaping into furnace compartment intended for air
space. The Texas courts certainly draw a very technical and unrealistic dis-
tinction when allowing recovery in one instance for damage due to smoke and
soot from a fire escaping into an area not intendeld, although still within the
furnace; and in another case not allowing recovery for damage due to actual
burning of the insured article where the fire does not escape.
19 Id. at 27, 6 S. W. 2d at 745.
"Nothing was consumed by fire.... Had the fire been brought out of the
flue, and anything had been burnt, the company would have been liable." Austin
v. Drewe, 4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6
Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1816). "I think that there is loss or damage
caused by fire when there has been ignition of insured property which was not
intended to be ignited, or when insured property has been damaged otherwise than
19521
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except for the damage to the furnace, grate, and range, are all losses
short of burning from a friendly fire and so would not be included under
the protection of the policy. In the case of the burning out of the
furnace, grate, and range, the probable intention of the parties would
prevent recovery, as it would be reasonably understood that they did
not intend recovery for such gradual wear and tear by fire. 2
1
It is not suggested that the distinction between friendly and hostile
fires be entirely discarded, as it probably serves a useful purpose in
prohibiting recovery for damages short of burning arising from a
friendly fire. But the distinction should be limited to its original con-
ception as devised in Austin v. Drewe and further clarified by Harris
v. Poland,22 and used as a rule of construction determining the probable
intention of the parties rather than as a rule of law limiting the insur-
er's liability. As defined in Austin v. Drewe, a friendly fire would be
one which is intentionally kindled, is always confined to the place where
it was intended to be, is not at all excessive, and does not burn or con-
sume anything not intended to be consumed. Therefore, as applied to
the facts of the principal Kansas case, recovery should have been
allowed because there was in truth a hostile fire-there was a burning
of the insured article,23 and it does not matter that the burning resulted
from the article being thrown into the fire rather than the fire coming
to it. As succinctly stated in the Harris v. Poland case:
".. . the risks against which the plaintiff is insured include the
risk of insured property coming unintentionally in contact with
fire and being thereby destroyed or damaged, and it matters not
whether that fire comes to the insured property or the insured
property comes to the fire."'24
by ignition as a direct consequence of the ignition of other property not intended to
be ignited." Harris v. Poland [1941] 1 K. B. 462, 473. For some reason this
portion of the case as reported in 164 L. T. 283, 287 (K. B. 1941) is worded
differently from that quoted here, though in substance containing the same thought.
- The fear of the Texas court on this point seems to be clearly without basis
as no cases'have been found in which there has been an attempt to recover for
the replacement of furnace, grate, and range when burned out from normal use
and ordinary deterioration.
2' In an exhaustive analysis of Austin v. Drewe, the English court discards the
argument of the insurer that that case stands for the proposition that the policy
covers only damage done to the insured property in a place where no fire was
intended to be; rather said the English court its basis is that there must be a con-
suming by fire of something not intended to be consumed, and the primary ground
of the decision in Austin v. Drewe was the absence of any burning of any of the
insured property.
" As stated by the dissenting judge in Harter v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 257 Mich.
163, 241 N. W. 196 (1932): "The loss involved [damage to rings accidentally
thrown into furnace] was occasioned by direct action of the fire. It was not like
the scorched sugar case of Austin v. Drewe where there was no ignition of
the sugar. That case is analogous to seeking to hold an insurance company liable
for damage to beans while baking in an oven, and has no application to the facts
here involved."
' [1941] 1 K. B. 462, 468, 164 L. T. 283, 285 (K. B.),
[Vol. 30
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The point raised in some of the cases, including Austin v. Drewe,
that the loss was due only to the negligence of the insured or his serv-
ants is of no weight whatever in denying recovery under the insurance
policy. It is well settled that mere carelessness and negligence of the
insured or his servants, not amounting to fraud, though the direct cause
of the fire, are covered by the policy unless specifically excepted.2 5  In
fire risks it is one of the objects of insuring to secure indemnity against
the consequences of negligence.
26
The one possible objection against the viewpoint urged here is that
fraudulent destruction of property in order to collect insurance might
be made easier. But this danger exists in any kind of insurance and
might be adequately guarded against by requiring convincing proof
that the loss did not result from the intentional act of the insured.
It is submitted that the American courts should restrict the friendly
fire doctrine to its original limitations as set forth in Austin v. Drewe.
Recovery should be permitted where there is an actual burning27 of the
insured article, for in such case there is indeed, from a realistic point of
view, a hostile fire.
HARRY E. FAGGART, JR.
Insurance-Suspension and Revival of Policy After
Breach of Condition
Plaintiff trucking corporation sought recovery in a federal district
court in North Carolina from defendant insurance company for the loss
of a quantity of cigarettes by theft from one of its trucks. Insured's
driver parked the truck containing the cigarettes and went across the
street to a cafe. He failed to turn on the alarm system on the truck which
would sound a siren if the truck were moved.' The driver returned to
" Federal Ins. Co. v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 117 F. 2d 794 (5th Cir. 1941);
Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935); Harter v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 257 Mich. 163, 241 N. W. 196 (1932) (dissenting opinion);
Weiner v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st
Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1st
Dep't 1925); 5 "APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTcE §3114 (1941); 2
MAY ON INSURANCE §408 (3d ed. 1891).
20 This was recognized by the Kansas court: "Negligence or inadvertence of
an insured or of one of his employees of course ordinarily would not bar recov-
ery. ... " Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472, 477 (Kan. 1951).
By "burning" it is meant that injury or destructive change is produced by
direct contact with the flame or by actual ignition. Depending on the physical
characteristics of the insured article, it might or might not be consumed or reduced
to ashes.
"The trailer was equipped With the theft protection device, described in the
policy and known as the Senior Babaco Alarm, consisting of two parts, the 'Sealed
Load' alarm and the 'Parker alarm.'" ". . . the 'Parker' alarm is designed to
prevent the unauthorized movement of the trailer. When the 'Parker' switch is
'on,' it is impossible to move the vehicle without sounding the siren alarm."
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 193 F. 2d
812 at 814 (4th Cir. 1951).
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